

Policy Implementation of PSU Handover in Griya Srimahi Indah Housing

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Abstract. *This study examines the implementation of the policy for handing over infrastructure, facilities, and utilities in supporting settlement suitability in Griya Srimahi Indah Housing, Bekasi Regency. The policy is intended to ensure that basic settlement facilities are managed by the local government after being handed over by private developers. The study addresses three main questions: how the handover policy is implemented, what major challenges arise in the process, and what roles are played by key stakeholders. A qualitative case study approach is employed, using in-depth interviews, non-participant observation, and document analysis. The findings show that implementation is partial and has not fully achieved the intended objectives. In terms of communication, coordination between government agencies remains inconsistent. Regarding resources, there are limitations in technical human resources within the local government and limited budget support. In terms of disposition, implementers show uneven commitment in completing administrative procedures. From the bureaucratic structure perspective, handover procedures are fragmented across several work units. Stakeholders such as the local government, the developer, and residents have differing interests, while coordination mechanisms have not been optimally developed. The study concludes that policy implementation proceeds at an inconsistent pace, constrained by a structural context that does not sufficiently support consistent implementation and by stakeholder roles that are not yet facilitated through structured policy communication and participation.*

Keywords: PSU Policy, Policy Implementation, Housing, Griya Srimahi Indah, Bekasi Regency

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INTRODUCTION

The provision of policies governing the transfer of infrastructure, facilities, and utilities in Indonesia is one measure of regional development aimed at increasing people's welfare (Permatasari et al., 2021; Nugroho, 2023; Hidayati & Permana, 2022). This policy stands in the close relationship with local government's commitment to manage well some basic facilities such as road, clean water supply, drainage and waste management after been handed over by private housing developers following the provisions stated in both national laws on housing and local government (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 2011; Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 2014) and implemented in Bekasi Regency via Regulation No.9/2017 about Handover of PSU. The handover process not only impacts the material condition of infrastructure but is also closely connected to transparent and accountable local governance and to the allocation of public resources at the local level (Hasibuan & Sugiarto, 2025; Sumaryana et al., 2024; Edwards et al., 2015; Fernando, 2019).

Bekasi Regency, located in West Java Province, is one of the regions experiencing rapid development, supported by relatively high economic growth over the past few years. Between 2020 and 2023, the regency's economic growth rebounded from a contraction during the COVID-

19 pandemic, reaching 5.32% in 2023, slightly higher than the provincial and national averages (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah Kabupaten Bekasi, 2024). However, this economic performance has not been fully matched by effective management and maintenance of settlement infrastructure. The local government faces major challenges in financing and human resources for the management of roads, clean water networks, drainage systems, and other public utilities after PSU assets are handed over (Kusnadi, 2023; Timbung, 2026; Sinha & Keiter, 2009; Larasati & Permadi, 2025).

The implementation of the PSU handover policy in Bekasi Regency remains far from optimal. As of October 2024, only a small proportion of housing estates had completed PSU handover from developers to the local government, indicating significant gaps in compliance and administrative completion (Dinas Perumahan Rakyat, Kawasan Permukiman dan Pertanahan Kabupaten Bekasi, 2024). This situation underscores the critical role of housing developers in fulfilling their legal obligation to hand over PSU to the government, as well as the need for effective coordination and supervision by local authorities (Gonzalez et al., 2021; Khaire & Jha, 2022). Limited budget allocations, complex administrative procedures, and fragmented interagency coordination are among the factors that constrain consistent policy implementation at the local level (Howlett et al., 2009; Krisdiyanti et al., 2023; Maulydina & Jannah, 2023; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980).

Griya Srimahi Indah Housing, located in Srimahi Village, North Tambun District, represents a concrete example of these implementation challenges. According to the developer's data, by October 2025, PSU handover in this housing estate had reached 65,933 m², or approximately 46% of the total obligated area. While certain components, such as green open space, are close to completion, others, such as roads, drainage, social facilities, and water retention ponds, remain only partially handed over. This partial achievement indicates that 54% of the PSU obligations remain unmet, reflecting obstacles in administrative processes, technical verification, funding certainty, and coordination between the developer and the local government.

Preliminary observations and document reviews in Griya Srimahi Indah reveal several issues that illustrate the suboptimal implementation of the PSU handover policy (Imanda, 2025; Salihin et al., 2026; Vitriana, 2019). These issues include incomplete handover documents, limited socialization of the handover process to residents, limited transparency of progress data, discrepancies between on-the-ground conditions and the approved site plan, and non-standardized verification procedures and documentation.

In addition, there are problems related to uncertain post-handover financing schemes, incomplete evidence of environmental compliance (drainage, green open spaces, and waste management), limited supervisory personnel, delayed or unfulfilled handover by developers, conversion of PSU land into residential plots due to weak oversight, unclear asset ownership status and legality, weak inter-agency coordination, inconsistent enforcement of administrative sanctions, and overlapping institutional authorities. Together, these problems highlight the complexity of PSU policy implementation at the local level and resonate with broader challenges of policy implementation in developing country contexts (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975).

Analytically, this study adopts George C. Edward III's model of policy implementation, which emphasizes four key dimensions: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure (Edward III, 1980). Communication concerns the clarity and consistency of information and instructions delivered to implementing actors. In the context of PSU handover, delays and ambiguities in communication between developers and local government agencies can result in unclear responsibilities and neglected facilities (Insani et al., 2022). Resources refer to the availability of adequate human, financial, and technical capacity to manage and maintain PSU after handover; limitations in these areas have been reflected in the poor condition and rapid deterioration of some facilities (Kurnia et al., 2024; Kusnadi, 2023).

Disposition relates to the attitudes and commitment of implementers; a lack of proactive behavior and responsiveness among officials and developers can hinder problem-solving and reduce public trust (Anggraini et al., 2022). Finally, bureaucratic structure encompasses the organizational arrangements and procedures governing the handover; fragmented mandates and lengthy administrative procedures tend to slow decision-making and weaken accountability (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980; Saputro, 2021; Sucita, 2021).

On the other hand, governance visions focus on networks of actors across the public, private, and community spheres that together shape policy outcomes (Skelcher et al., 2005; Atkinson & Coleman, 1992; Cashore et al., 2021; Bang & Esmark, 2009). In the broader urban housing context, international reports have also stressed the need for enabling governance arrangements, sufficient infrastructure financing, and community participation to develop inclusive and sustainable settlements (Satterthwaite, 2016).

Against this backdrop, the implementation of the PSU handover policy in Griya Srimahi Indah Housing is both empirically important and analytically relevant to study. Despite PSU's strategic role in ensuring decent, safe, and sustainable settlements, the actual implementation at the housing estate level has not been systematically evaluated. This study therefore seeks to analyze and evaluate: (1) how the implementation of the PSU handover policy supports settlement suitability in Griya Srimahi Indah Housing; (2) what major challenges are encountered in the implementation process; and (3) how key stakeholders namely the local government, the housing developer, and residents play their roles in the implementation of the PSU handover policy. The findings are expected to provide constructive input for improving local policy implementation and enhancing the suitability of settlements in Griya Srimahi Indah Housing and similar developments.

METHODS

Research Design

This study uses a qualitative approach with a single case study design to gain an in-depth understanding of the implementation of the policy on the handover of infrastructure, facilities, and utilities (PSU). This approach allows for the exploration of the experiences, perceptions, and interactions of actors in their natural context (Creswell, 2018). The case study refers to Yin's (Yin, 2018) typology and is positioned as a representative case, because Griya Srimahi Indah reflects the general characteristics of urban middle-class housing: phased development, private developer involvement, and partial delays in PSU handover. Thus, the generalization made is analytical generalization to broaden the theoretical understanding of PSU policy implementation in the relationship between local government and developers.

Conceptual and Analytical Framework

The analysis is guided by Edward III's policy implementation model, which identifies four key dimensions: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure (Edward III, 1980). These four dimensions were operationalized into empirical indicators: (1) communication clarity of regulations, consistency of coordination, and frequency of socialization; (2) resources availability of budget, technical capacity, and personnel; (3) disposition commitment and compliance of actors to regulations; (4) bureaucratic structure clarity of SOPs and fragmentation of authority. These indicators are translated into semi-structured interview guidelines, observation of administrative processes, and document analysis. Conceptually, PSU is understood in three interrelated aspects: legal-administrative (legality of assets and handover documents), technical-physical (condition and function of facilities), and governance (sustainability of management) (Grindle, 1980; Onyango & Hyden, 2021; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980).

Research Focus, Setting, and Data Collection

The study focused on implementation of PSU handover policies in the Griya Srimahi Indah Housing Complex, Srimahi Village, Tambun Utara Subdistrict, Bekasi Regency. The location was

chosen purposively because the handover process has not been fully completed and reflected the dynamics of coordination between developers and local government (Dinas Perumahan Rakyat Kawasan Permukiman dan Pertanahan Kabupaten Bekasi, 2024). Data were collected from September to December 2025 using three techniques: (1) five semi-structured interviews (one official from Public Works Agency, two developer representatives, two residents) lasting 30-40 minutes; (2) 5 non-participant observations of the physical condition of the PSU and the coordination process; and (3) analysis of 7 official documents, including laws and regulations, Bekasi Regency Regulation No. 9/2017, official reports, site plans, and progress reports from relevant agencies (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Fiantika et al., 2022). Data saturation was considered achieved in the third interview when no new substantive themes were found in the following two interviews.

Participants, Data Analysis, and Trustworthiness

Informants were selected purposively based on their direct involvement, procedural understanding, and representation of different institutional positions. To minimize bias due to power relations between officials, developers and residents, the interviews were conducted separately and data was cross-verified between groups of actors. The researchers had no institutional involvement with the parties studied (Creswell, 2018; Sahir, 2021). Data analysis used a hybrid coding approach: the initial stage was conducted deductively based on Edward III's four dimensions, then developed inductively to identify emergent themes. The analysis process followed the interactive model of Miles et al. (2014), including data condensation, data presentation, and conclusion drawing and verification (Miles et al., 2014; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980). Consistency of interpretation was maintained through recoding of some of the data. Data validity was strengthened through triangulation of sources and methods, member checking with five key informants, and peer debriefing in academic discussions (Creswell, 2018; Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Yin, 2018). All participants signed informed consent forms, their identities were disguised, and data was stored in encrypted form. This study has obtained institutional ethical approval. The limitations of the study lie in its four month duration, which limits observations of the long-term implementation dynamics and annual budget cycles. The findings represent the conditions during the study period.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Overview of the Study Site and Institutions

Griya Srimahi Indah is a subsidized housing estate developed since 2017 by PT Prima Tossa Perkasa on approximately 34.3 hectares of land in Srimahi Village, North Tambun District, Bekasi Regency. The estate targets low-income households through subsidized mortgage schemes and currently contains around 3,000 planned housing units, with about 2,000 units already built. The site is relatively accessible, linked to local and regional road networks, and within commuting distance to industrial areas in Bekasi-Cikarang and Jakarta. This pattern aligns with broader trends of rapid peri-urban growth in Indonesia and other parts of Asia (UN-Habitat, 2011, 2016; World Bank, 2012, 2015). Land use is divided into effective residential land and infrastructure and facilities land.

Table 1. Summarizes the Land-Use Composition

Category	Area (m ²)	Percentage (%)
Effective residential land	199,866	58.27
Infrastructure and facilities	143,149	41.73
Total	343,015	100.00

Source: Internal data of Griya Srimahi Indah Housing developer (2025).

Infrastructure and facilities land includes roads and drainage, social facilities, green open spaces, and a planned water retention pond. According to developer data, the total infrastructure, facilities, and utilities obligation is 143,149 m², of which 65,933 m² (46%) had been handed over

by October 2025. Institutionally, the Department of Public Housing, Settlement Areas, and Land (Disperkimtan) of Bekasi Regency is responsible for verifying and receiving these assets, in accordance with regional regulations and internal decrees that define the roles of the Public Housing Development Team within Disperkimtan.

A conceptual framework guiding this study is illustrated in Figure 1. Thus, the problem of implementation does not lie in the design of land allocation, but rather in the institutional capacity and incentives of actors to transform normative obligations into operational public assets.




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of Handover Policy Implementation Based on Edward III's Model.

Source: Adapted from Edward III (1980)

Implementation of the Handover Policy

Handover Process

The handover process in Griya Srimahi Indah follows Bekasi Regency Regulation No. 9/2017, which requires developers to submit basic facilities to the local government for further management. Empirical findings show that implementation broadly follows the formal stages: submission of a handover request by the developer; internal meetings and site visits by Disperkimtan to verify legal documents, technical quality, and conformity with the approved site plan; opportunities for the developer to correct deficiencies; splitting of the master land certificate into infrastructure, facilities, and utilities parcels; processing of grant deeds at village and sub-district levels; and issuance of official handover minutes signed by the Regent. From the developer's perspective, the procedure description is consistent, emphasizing certificate splitting and the sequence of meetings and inspections leading up to the final signing of the minutes. A schematic representation of the handover procedure is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Simplified procedural flow of infrastructure, facilities, and utilities handover in Bekasi Regency

Source: Bekasi Regency Regulation No. 9/2017 and interview data (2025).

Although formal stages have been carried out, partial realization indicates a gap between procedural compliance and substantive achievements. This condition indicates that regulatory clarity alone is not sufficient to ensure effective implementation. From a policy implementation perspective, this situation reflects what is known as institutional path dependency, whereby repetitive and slow administrative practices are reproduced without structural correction even though regulations are well established. The lengthy process becomes a form of “bureaucratic normalization” that reduces the urgency of fully fulfilling PSU obligations. This pattern of partial compliance and fragmented institutional responsibility is consistent with broader observations about policy implementation in decentralized settings (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975).

Quality of Facilities Handed Over

Field observations and resident interviews reveal a mixed picture regarding the quality of infrastructure, facilities, and utilities. Several facilities such as the mosque, green open spaces, and a health facility (puskesmas) are functioning well and perceived positively by residents. On the other hand, some roads exhibit cracks and potholes, drainage channels are clogged by vegetation, and a sports hall and some public lighting units are poorly maintained or non-functional. Residents generally acknowledge that basic facilities exist, but emphasize the need for repairs. One resident stated:

“Some of the roads here have potholes, and the drainage channels are not functioning because they are clogged.” (Resident A, Interview, 2025).

Another resident added:

“Overall, the facilities are quite good, but there are still parts that need repair.” (Resident B, Interview, 2025).

The gap between the existence of facilities and their actual quality shows that verification standards place greater emphasis on compliance with site plans than on functional sustainability. This has implications for the potential long-term maintenance burden on local governments after assets are received. In the literature on infrastructure governance, the imbalance between formal compliance and functional adequacy is often a source of fiscal inefficiency in the post-handover phase (Gonzalez et al., 2021; Khaire & Jha, 2022; UN-Habitat, 2011, 2016).

Timing and Pace of Handover

In terms of timing, the handover at Griya Srimahi Indah is slower than regulatory expectations. By October 2025, only 46% of the obligation had been realized, even though the estate had been under development for about 9 years. The regional regulation stipulates that for

housing projects above 25 hectares, handover should be completed within 10 years, leaving only 1 year for the developer to complete the remaining 54%.

Table 2. Summarizes The Realization of Infrastructure, Facilities, and Utilities Handover in Griya Srimahi Indah Housing as Of October 2025

No	Indicator	Target (m ²)	Realization (m ²)	Achievement (%)
1	Roads and drainage	97,475	40,425	41
2	Social facilities	13,758	3,563	26
3	Green open space/parks	22,641	21,945	97
4	Water retention pond	9,275	-	0
Total		143,149	65,933	46

Source: Internal documents of Griya Srimahi Indah Housing developer (2025).

Table 2 shows a disproportionate pattern of implementation: green open spaces are almost complete (97%), while reservoirs have not been implemented (0%), and roads and drainage are only 41% complete. This pattern cannot be understood solely as an administrative delay. Economically and politically, facilities that have a direct impact on market perception and sale value, such as parks, are prioritized, while risk mitigation infrastructure such as reservoirs tends to be delayed because it does not provide immediate returns.

Thus, the implementation of the PSU policy took place within the context of market rationality. Developers disposition toward regulatory compliance was influenced by calculations of costs, risks, and market absorption. This broadens the reading of the dimensions of disposition and resources in Edward III's model: neither are neutral, but operate within economic incentive structure that shape the rhythm of development.

Furthermore, administrative tolerance for delays indicates implicit negotiations between investment interests and regulatory enforcement. This explains why delays can persist even when regulatory deadlines have been set. Comparable administrative bottlenecks and timing mismatches have also been observed in other local policy implementations (Insani et al., 2022; Kurnia et al., 2024; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973).

Key Challenges in Policy Implementation

Administrative Constraints

Administrative obstacles are among the main challenges in implementation. The splitting of land certificates for parcels is particularly time-consuming, as it requires coordination with village heads, sub-district offices, the land office, and various local government units. Both the developer and Disperkimtan acknowledge that the length of the splitting process slows down verification and delays the issuance of handover minutes. Similar administrative bottlenecks and fragmented responsibilities have been found in other policy implementation settings (Insani et al., 2022; Krisdiyanti et al., 2023; Saputro, 2021).

These administrative delays indicate that implementation is hampered not only by the volume of paperwork but also by the absence of streamlined procedures and clear time standards for each step. Simplifying documentation requirements and establishing clearer service standards for certificate splitting would be crucial to accelerating handover. Similar findings about administrative bottlenecks and procedural complexity have been reported in other local policy settings (Insani et al., 2022; Krisdiyanti et al., 2023; Saputro, 2021; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980). This fragmentation reinforces the bureaucratic structure dimension in Edward III's model as a key factor. Segmented structured increase coordination costs and lengthen decision cycles, thereby reinforcing patterns of partial implementation.

Resource Limitations

Resource constraints, especially within Disperkimtan, also significantly affect implementation. Budget allocations are mainly limited to verification activities, while funds for

post-handover maintenance and rehabilitation can be directed only to housing estates whose facilities have been formally handed over. At the same time, the number of technical staff available to conduct field verification is limited, requiring reliance on developer assistance during site visits. This pattern reflects broader findings that limited technical and financial resources weaken local policy implementation and infrastructure maintenance (Kurnia et al., 2024; Kusnadi, 2023; Nur & Nur, 2025; UN-Habitat, 2016). Thus, implementation problems lie not only with the commitment of private actors, but also with the limited capacity of local governments to keep pace with market dynamics. This pattern is consistent with studies showing that limited technical and financial resources weaken the effectiveness of local policy implementation and environmental governance (Kurnia et al., 2024; Kusnadi, 2023; Nur & Nur, 2025; UN-Habitat, 2016).

Inter-Agency Coordination and Communication

Coordination between Disperkimtan and the Office of Public Works and Spatial Planning is another major challenge. While that office is responsible for approving housing site plans, Disperkimtan is responsible for receiving facilities. In practice, information on approved site plans is not systematically shared with Disperkimtan, creating data gaps when developers apply for handover. Governance perspectives highlight how policy outcomes are shaped by interactions among multiple actors and institutions (May & Jochim, 2013; Siddiki et al., 2015; Broccardo et al., 2019; Newell et al., 2012). Fragmented coordination between agencies in this case mirrors governance challenges reported in other local policy interventions (Maulydina & Jannah, 2023).

To address this, Disperkimtan has initiated formal correspondence to request site-plan data and build its own database. However, inconsistencies remain, and a lack of an integrated information system leads to delays and confusion about the status and scope of obligations. In contrast, communication between the developer and Disperkimtan is perceived by both parties as relatively smooth and cooperative. This kind of fragmented coordination across agencies is a common challenge in local governance and has been observed in other policy domains, including social policy interventions and education programs (Maulydina & Jannah, 2023; Sucita, 2021).

Infrastructure Problems and Maintenance Gaps

The condition and completeness of the infrastructure itself present persistent challenges. As long as components have not been formally handed over, the developer remains fully responsible for repair and maintenance. Delays in construction or repairs mean residents experience the consequences directly, including damaged roads, clogged drains, and broken streetlights. The developer acknowledges that around 20% of road sections and some lighting units require repair. Field observations confirm these problems but also show that some components, particularly social facilities and green open spaces, are well developed and actively used by residents. Comparable issues of deteriorating facilities in the absence of clear maintenance responsibilities have been highlighted in studies of urban infrastructure and housing governance (Gonzalez et al., 2021; Khaire & Jha, 2022; Kusnadi, 2023; UN-Habitat, 2011, 2016). These findings illustrate that infrastructure challenges are closely tied to the pace of development, market conditions, and the absence of clear, enforceable timelines and technical standards for facility condition at the point of handover.

Stakeholder Roles in Policy Implementation

Local Government (Disperkimtan)

Disperkimtan plays a central role as verifier, recipient, and subsequent manager of infrastructure, facilities, and utilities. Once assets are formally handed over, legal responsibility for maintenance shifts from the developer to the local government. Disperkim has handed over facilities with signage indicating that the land has become a government asset, which also informs residents of the facilities' status. The agency plans to re-inspect facilities one to two years after handover and allocates budgets for maintenance in subsequent fiscal years. However, limited technical staff and budget constrain the scope and speed of the government's response. Thus,

while Disperkimtan formally assumes responsibility, its ability to fulfill this role effectively is shaped by broader institutional and resource limitations, as also noted in studies of local service provision and administrative reform (Anggraini et al., 2022; Insani et al., 2022; Hyden & Onyango, 2021; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973).

Housing Developer

The developer is the key actor responsible for providing and handing over at least 40% of the total land area as infrastructure, facilities, and utilities, as stipulated in the regional regulation. In Griya Srimahi Indah, this obligation amounts to 143,149 m², but only 65,933 m² (46%) had been handed over by October 2025, indicating that more than half the obligation remains unmet.

The developer states that quality is prioritized through the use of appropriate materials and internal supervision to minimize future repair costs. Nevertheless, delays in construction, market-driven phasing, and slow administrative processes have resulted in partial and delayed fulfillment of obligations. This suggests that, beyond legal awareness, the developer's commitment and internal prioritization significantly influence the rhythm of policy implementation. The importance of implementer commitment and motivation (disposition) has similarly been emphasized in other public policy implementation studies (Anggraini et al., 2022; Kurnia et al., 2024; Saputro, 2021).

Residents

Residents of Griya Srimahi Indah are the direct beneficiaries of the infrastructure, facilities, and utilities, and they play a role in the routine maintenance and monitoring of these facilities. They participate in community work such as cleaning drains and maintaining public spaces, usually organized through neighborhood meetings. These forums also provide residents with opportunities to voice complaints and propose improvements to housing facilities. Residents support the handover policy because it enables them to request repairs directly from the local government and strengthens their expectations of decent, sustainable settlement facilities. At the same time, their participation remains largely informal and has not yet been systematically integrated into formal monitoring or decision-making mechanisms. Previous research suggests that structured citizen participation can significantly enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of local public services and policy outcomes (Maulydina & Jannah, 2023; Nur & Nur, 2025; UN-Habitat, 2016). The importance of structured citizen participation for sustaining public facilities is widely recognized in the literature (UN-Habitat, 2011, 2016; Maulydina & Jannah, 2023; Nur & Nur, 2025).

Synthesis Based on Edward III's Implementation Model

Viewed through Edward III's four dimensions of communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure, the implementation of the handover policy in Griya Srimahi Indah is characterized by partial achievement and an inconsistent implementation rhythm (Edward III, 1980). The Griya Srimahi Indah case shows that Edward III's four dimensions are closely interrelated in context of interactions between bureaucracy and the market. Fragmented communication, limited resources, dispositions influenced by economic rationality, and complex bureaucratic structures form an ecosystem of slow and partial implementation (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975).

These interrelated factors explain why, despite a clear regulatory framework and generally favorable stakeholder perceptions of the policy, implementation in Griya Srimahi Indah remains partial and slow. The findings underscore that improving policy outcomes will require not only compliance with formal procedures but also strengthened interagency communication, enhanced governmental resources, more proactive commitment from developers, and more participatory mechanisms that involve residents in monitoring and maintaining facilities. (Anggraini et al., 2022; Kurnia et al., 2024; Nur & Nur, 2025; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980).

This finding expands Edward III's model by showing that in market-based housing policy, disposition cannot be understood solely as a normative commitment, but as the result of economic calculations within a framework of structural incentives. (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Edward III, 1980; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980). The implications for problem solving arising from these findings include: integration of cross-agency information system, setting standards for administrative service times, strengthening the technical capacity of local governments, and more structured mechanisms for citizen participation to strengthen social accountability.

CONCLUSION

The implementation of the policy for handing over infrastructure, facilities, and utilities in Griya Srimahi Indah Housing takes place within a dynamic shaped by four interrelated dimensions: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure. Inter-agency communication is fragmented, so verification and determination of asset status do not proceed in a synchronized way. Resource capacity, in terms of both technical staff and budget, is not fully aligned with the responsibilities that arise after handover. In contrast, the developer's commitment to completing administrative and technical requirements is uneven. At the same time, a layered, fragmented bureaucratic structure produces a slow, unstable implementation trajectory. In this context, the roles of local government, the developer, and residents together determine implementation outcomes: the government's oversight is limited by capacity constraints, the developer's disposition is inconsistent, and residents' potential to support the sustainability of facilities is not yet fully developed through structured participation.

SUGGESTION

To strengthen the implementation of the handover policy in Griya Srimahi Indah Housing and similar developments, the administrative flow should be simplified by consolidating verification processes into a single leading agency and supported by standardized coordination mechanisms, such as a shared database or dashboard on asset status. Local government needs to enhance human resource capacity for verification and monitoring, conduct regular post-handover inspections using standard instruments, and consistently enforce administrative sanctions against developers who do not meet handover deadlines. Developers should prepare and submit technical and legal documents more systematically from the outset, ensuring accurate data on areas and asset legality. At the same time, residents' roles in maintaining and monitoring facilities should be institutionalized through forums or self-help groups that routinely document facility conditions and report damage, so that community participation becomes an integral element of sustaining settlement suitability.

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